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Design thinking (DT) has been widely promoted as a 
powerful approach for systematically achieving 
innovation, particularly in the world of management. 
Recently, however, some critical voices from design 
and science & technology studies have called 
bullshit on DT, accusing it instead of distorting and 
trivialising design methods and processes to serve 
purely commercial goals. Through an analysis of the 
recent history of design research and an overview of 
some (philosophical) accounts on the concept of 
“bullshit”, this paper shows that at least some of the 
criticism holds. However, it argues that a truly fruitful 
critique of DT needs to go beyond simple derision. 
Ultimately, this paper suggests that perhaps we 
should steer away from the idea that there is a 
designerly way of thinking, and focus instead on 
showing how designers, being “doers”, create 
maker’s knowledge. Designers, educators, 
managers, and anyone interested in understanding 
why design goes beyond a simple methodology 
perhaps might be interested in this account.  
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1 | INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the last decade, design thinking (DT) 
has been heavily promoted as an effective system to 
tackle all kinds of problems, from conceiving new 
products to providing drinking water to small 
communities in the Global South. Addressing 
problems the way designers (supposedly) do—
advocates of DT suggest—is not only an excellent 
approach to innovation but also one that is guided 
by human needs. DT has become popular within 
management and financial circles; but after almost 
fifty years of neoliberalisation, the idioms and 
practices of that culture have penetrated every 
domain of human activity. Consequently, DT has 
found its way into many different kinds of public and 
private organisations with its most vocal promoter 
being the “d.school” based in Stanford University. 
Despite its seemingly well-intentioned selling points, 
some critical voices have called DT into question, or 
rather, have called bullshit on DT, implying that it is 
little more than another jargon-filled management 
fad driven by mere commercialisation. Admittedly, 
the world of management has been known to 
endorse almost any “philosophy” that offers to give 
its practitioners some competitive business or 
administrative advantage, regardless of the 
soundness of its principles. However, the idea that 
designing is not just a discipline (but rather a distinct 
epistemic system), and that tackling highly complex 
problems is its raison d’être, has been endorsed by 





DT advocates characterise it as a “human-centered, 
creative, iterative, and practical approach to finding 
the best ideas and ultimate solutions” (Brown, 2008, 
p. 92); as an unparalleled method to “innovate”. 
They contend that even though DT is firmly 
grounded on tried and tested design methods and 
processes used by (some) designers to tackle 
design issues, the methodology is easily portable 
and can be executed by any (expediently trained) 
person in any given context. Some DT enthusiasts 
(Dunne & Martin, 2006) in business schools have 
even suggested incorporating said methodology as 
part of their core curricula. However, by far the most 
touted virtue of DT is how it fosters empathy 
amongst its practitioners and, consequently, enables 
them to gain a better understanding of those at the 
receiving end of any DT-guided undertaking (e.g., 
clients, users, or employees). 
Conversely, detractors of design thinking contend 
that it distorts design methods and innovation. They 
claim it is reductive and uncritical and that it focuses 
on simplistic processes rather than on concrete 
outputs (Jen, 2017). They also claim design thinking 
trivialises how innovations come about and 
promotes a “skewed” understanding of the role 
design plays in such processes (Vinsel, 2017). In the 
end, for these critics, design thinking merely 
condenses a formulaic and naive view of the design 
process, using buzzwords and corporate jargon, for 
the benefit of non-designers. Moreover, since such 
an audience is mainly located within the world of 
management, it follows that design thinking has less 
to do with design or social change and more with 
business (Vinsel, 2017). 
This paper shows that the better part of the above 
criticism stands to truth, since some advocates of (a 
particular strain of) DT do engage in some types of 
bullshitting, but argues that the judgement cannot be 
generalised. The main reasons are that neither 
bullshit nor DT are consensually defined or even 
homogeneous concepts. Therefore, this paper 
argues that a more fruitful critique of DT requires 
going beyond the name-calling by promoting a 
broader and deeper understanding of design but 
also of innovation and technological change. 
The first section offers a general description of the 
historical context in which DT emerged and grew in 
popularity. Next comes a summary of the main 
arguments held by detractors of DT, followed by a 
survey of three different (philosophical) 
characterisations of bullshit. This is followed by an 
in-depth discussion of DT in light of the previous 
accounts. Ultimately, this paper suggests that 
perhaps we should steer away from the idea that 
there is a designerly way of thinking, regard it as a 
brand, and focus instead on showing why designers, 
like other “doers”, create maker’s knowledge.  
2 | NEOLIBERALISM, CHANGE FOR THE SAKE 
OF CHANGE, AND DESIGN 
Throughout the last half-century, most countries in 
the world yielded to the neoliberal program, 
undergoing profound social transformations. 
Neoliberalisation, i.e., the process whereby radical 
market rule is aggressively encouraged and assisted 
by the political class (see Peck, 2010, p. xii), is not 
only a socioeconomic but also a cultural change. 
Neoliberal doctrine is overtly antagonistic towards 
government oversight, which it denounces as 
hopelessly bureaucratic. Nonetheless, as 
anthropologist David Graeber notes, if anything has 
been shown in the past decades is that most policies 
intended for curtailing government interference 
engendered more procedures and regulations 
(Graeber, 2015, p. 9). Neoliberalism, it turns out, is 
far from being the antithesis of regulation but rather 
“a self-contradictory form of regulation-in-denial” 
(Peck, 2010, p. xiii) that breeds even more 
bureaucracy. 
Neoliberalism enabled business organisations to 
claim more of the roles that were for a long time 
assumed to be government prerogatives (e.g., 
education, healthcare, policing) thus displacing the 
nation-state as the dominant political and cultural 
institutions of societies. In the process, business, 
and entrepreneurs began more aggressively 
portraying themselves as the primary agents of 
social change; management came to be mystified all 
the while the socioeconomic and historical 
circumstances behind neoliberalisation faded into 
the background (see LoRusso, 2017). Gradually, as 
Graeber also notes, public and private power ended 
up merging into a single entity leading to a state of 
“total bureaucratization” (2015, pp. 17-18) wherein 
government and private bureaucracies became 
indistinguishable. Deregulation and privatisation 
enabled the idiosyncrasies, worldview, and practices 
of the corporate culture to spread to every area of 
human activity where “people gather to discuss the 
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allocation of resources of any kind” (2015, p. 21). 
The hitherto alien techniques of corporate 
bureaucracy, its obsession with productivity and its 
penchant for jargon—in particular, “creativity” and 
“innovation”—have come to shape how we work, 
live, and play. 
While this state of affairs amounts to a bureaucratic 
takeover, managers, the protagonists behind this 
process, do not think of themselves as bureaucrats. 
Instead, they would like to portray themselves as 
potentially creative agents of change. Even though 
most of what they do involves devising new 
procedures, regulations and metrics to improve the 
“accountability” or “productivity” of the people under 
their command. Usually, this requires finding new 
ways to quantify the unquantifiable for the sake of 
systematising otherwise intuitive processes and 
facilitating automation. Total bureaucratisation thus 
comes disguised in the language of change; change 
that has gone from being the means for an end to an 
end in itself. The reinvention of innovation as an 
indispensable process for human development and 
wellbeing coincided with this change in values and 
practices (see Godin, 2008). 
Design is an activity and a practice concerned with 
creating plans for new things; it has come to be seen 
as a natural ally to fulfil the endless need to 
innovate. For many people in the world of 
management design methodologies appear to be 
recent adoptions, but the relationship between 
management and design has a long history, with 
some influential design theorists being also 
management theorists—prime examples being 
Donald Schön and Herbert A. Simon. Such 
circumstances have enabled the creators of a very 
specific design process (i.e., “design thinking”) to 
promote it as a kind of magic bullet to consistently 
come up with innovations. The new managerial 
class, whose job is to permanently create “hollow 
change” and who require a constant “supply of new 
management fads and fashions” (Spicer, 2017) have 
enthusiastically embraced it. 
3 | CALLING BULLSHIT ON DESIGN THINKING 
In a recent talk, Natasha Jen (2017), a graphic 
designer, design educator, and partner in 
Pentagram design studio, denounced the “complete 
lack of criticism” that the “design community” has 
shown against design thinking (DT) [1]. She showed 
how conducting a simple Google search on DT 
results in endless variations of the same motives: a 
diagram depicting a colour-coded five-step process 
accompanied by hyped business jargon or a group 
of enthusiastic people using Post-it notes. For Jen, 
although the five-step process gives the impression 
of being a thoroughly reasonable design 
methodology, it lacks a crucial component explicitly 
built into it: critical feedback. As a professional 
designer, Jen contends that feedback (however 
uncomfortable) and evaluation throughout the entire 
design process are the only means to improve any 
potential solution to a design problem. 
Jen also objects to the way DT has seemingly 
limited the design tools to a single medium: Post-it 
notes. She sees this as a token of the extent to 
which the DT advocates have downplayed the 
complexity of design as a professional practice. Jen 
is also aware of the historical roots of design 
practice and the academic lineage of design 
research. She notes that what eventually became 
DT initially emerged as a rigorous framework in 
industrial design but has since then been 
appropriated by other areas of design. Mostly, Jen is 
concerned about the way hyper-optimistic, but 
ultimately meaningless business jargon has 
supplanted serious reflection about design in 
general. Unimpressed by some design solutions 
created following DT methodology, Jen objects that 
a focus on the process rather than on the results 
seriously compromises the quality of the output. The 
way she sees it, genuinely successful design 
solutions (such as those created by Charles and 
Ray Eames) always involve a tangible “evidence” of 
the results. Therefore, she challenges DT 
enthusiasts to prove, not procedurally but through 
concrete results, how and why their methodology 
can live up to the hype. Finally, Jen offers her 
definition of design thinking, portraying it as 
something that: 
packages the designer’s way [of thinking] by 
working for a non-designer audience by 
codifying their processes into a prescriptive, 
step-by-step approach to creative problem 
solving, claiming that it can be applied by 
anyone to any problems. (Jen, 2017, min 
4:14) 
More recently, Jen (2018) doubled down on her 
criticism, noting how the more she has continued to 




outrageous it seems. Besides reaffirming her initial 
objections, Jen now highlights the “simplistic 
equation” that DT advocates claim that exists 
between DT methodology, creativity and innovation; 
as well as the way they reify innovation, treating it as 
more than an attribute or quality. Furthermore, Jen is 
appalled by way DT portrays design as a kind of 
“beast” that can be suddenly unleashed [2], thus 
obscuring the fact that designing is, in fact, a 
process; something that develops over a certain 
timespan. Consequently, DT promises quick, 
effortless results bordering the kind of instant but 
ultimately hollow satisfaction that fast food offers. 
For Jen, this fast food logic becomes dangerous 
when one looks at the way DT approaches 
education. DT training seems to be entirely based 
on bootcamps and fast short courses that give the 
impression that students can learn design 
methodology, “get good at it”, simply by following 
their curricula. 
In a recent article, Lee Vinsel (2017), STS professor 
at Virginia Tech, builds a case against DT along the 
same lines as Jen, although in a significantly more 
caustic style, comparing the cultural influence of DT 
to late-stage syphilis infection. Acknowledging his 
lack of expertise in design methodologies, Vinsel 
focuses instead on the way DT advocates portray 
“innovation” – which he derisively qualifies as a 
“lipstick-on-a-pig” conception. Vinsel, like Jen, is 
concerned by the way DT understands education; 
he is dismayed by the suggestion (apparently 
advanced by some of its advocates) that DT could 
eventually become the foundation of “the new liberal 
arts” [3]. Vinsel is unimpressed by such proposition 
and by the possibility that DT could be incorporated 
at secondary and undergraduate level education as 
a new core discipline. Mainly because DT 
encourages the notion that the ultimate goal of 
education is “social innovation”, a proposition which 
Vinsel qualifies as an “adolescent conception of 
culture”. Vinsel summarises his critique by arguing 
that DT is not about design, the liberal arts, or 
meaningful innovation, but about commercialisation 
and “making all education a shallow form of 
business education”. 
For all their bluntness, Jen’s and Vinsel’s criticisms 
make valid points: openness to feedback is crucial 
for any creative enterprise and in design tangible 
outcomes are the only means to judge how well a 
given solution works. Furthermore, innovation is a 
nebulous, relational concept, and shallowness is the 
least desirable feature one should associate with 
education. Nonetheless, name-calling and pungent 
commentaries only go so far when it comes to 
building fruitful criticism—not to mention that bullshit, 
like innovation, is seldomly defined. The following 
section provides an overview of the (philosophical) 
criteria to determine whether something might be 
called bullshit or not, and why. The goal here is not 
to attempt to settle once and for all what bullshit 
means but to provide a stepping stone for advancing 
our discussion and understanding of DT. 
4 | THREE WAYS TO UNDERSTAND BULLSHIT 
In everyday language, “bullshit” is unmistakably an 
expletive. Bullshit and bullshitters have been fairly 
common in human societies for a conceivably long 
time. However, in the mid-1980s, Harry Frankfurt 
noticed how little attention philosophers had paid to 
this phenomenon, and thus decided to turn it into a 
subject of serious philosophical enquiry. Originally 
published as an essay in 1986 and re-edited two 
decades later as a book, Frankfurt’s On Bullshit is 
the seminal work on the study of this phenomenon 
[4]. Frankfurt begins his conceptual analysis by 
dissecting Max Black’s (1982, p. 23) own 
characterisation of “humbug” as (a deliberate) 
“deceptive misrepresentation… of somebody’s 
thoughts, feelings, or attitudes”. Frankfurt notes that 
humbug might share some qualities with bullshit 
(namely, the intentional misrepresentation of one’s 
intentions), but he argues that Black’s account is not 
sufficiently adequate nor accurate for describing “the 
essential character of bullshit” (2005, p. 18). This 
essence, Frankfurt insists, lies in a lack of concern 
for the truth; in the bullshitter’s utmost “indifference 
to how things really are” (2005, pp. 33–34). 
Humbug, like lying, is intentionally deceptive and 
insincere, but bullshit does not need to be false. This 
feature is what according to Frankfurt makes bullshit 
more culturally tolerable but also more ethically 
dangerous. Liars deliberately conceal the truth; what 
they hide is their attempt to lead their audience 
“away from a correct apprehension of reality”. In this 
sense, liars know (and care) about the distinction 
between true and false information. By crafting 
falsities, liars are “responding” to and – to such 
extent – being “respectful of the truth”. 
Conversely, a bullshitter does not “care whether the 
things he says describe reality correctly”. Bullshitters 
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merely select, or “make up”, information to suit their 
purposes (2005, pp. 55–56). Whereas a liar 
intentionally rejects “the authority of the truth”, the 
bullshitter does not even acknowledge its existence. 
This omission makes bullshit “a greater enemy of 
the truth than lies” (2005, p. 61). It follows that in 
Frankfurt’s account, the intention—and hence, the 
mental state—of a person is the crucial factor in 
determining whether what he or she is saying can be 
qualified as bullshit. 
Frankfurt’s view, however, has been challenged. In 
his essay, Deeper Into Bullshit, G.A. Cohen argues 
that Frankfurt’s “activity-centred” definition is “too 
narrow” (2002, p. 337). “Frankfurt-bullshit”, Cohen 
notes, is “just one flower in the lush garden of 
bullshit”; it is exclusively concerned with “ordinary 
life”, leaving out, for example, the type of bullshit 
“that appears in academic works” (2002, p. 323). 
Cohen calls into question Frankfurt’s insistence on 
the “essential” features of bullshit because such 
definition is not characterising the utterance itself, 
but the bullshitter’s (morally questionable) state of 
mind. Cohen further questions Frankfurt’s sharp 
distinction between bullshitting and lying. He argues 
that “it is neither necessary nor sufficient for every 
kind of bullshit” to be uttered by someone indifferent 
to the truth (2002, p. 332). An honest, truth abiding 
person could be, unbeknownst to her, uttering 
bullshit out of ignorance—or due to self-deception or 
even for charitable reasons, as we will see below. 
Cohen thus suggests a different criterion for 
identifying bullshit: “unclarifiable unclarity”. Here, 
bullshit is discourse “that is not only obscure but 
which cannot be rendered unobscure”, since any 
attempt to clarify it yields “something that isn’t 
recognisable as a version of what was said (2002, 
pp. 332–333). Cohen thus places the blame not on 
the bullshitter but on bullshit itself. In this way, what 
is criticised is the product of bullshitting, which is 
visible, rather than the process that led to it, which is 
opaque (2002, p. 336). In summary, in Cohen’s 
“output-centred” approach, unmasking a bullshitter 
does not require proving that he did not care about 
the truth, but showing that his utterance, even when 
reformulated, cannot make sense. 
A third way to determine what may be qualified as 
bullshit stands mid-ground between Frankfurt’s and 
Cohen’s accounts. Philosopher Scott Kimbrough 
(2006) agrees that Frankfurt’s definition leaves out 
unintentional bullshitting, but he agrees with him that 
bullshit results from a lack of connection with the 
truth. Kimbrough objects that we should not and 
perhaps cannot eradicate bullshit from human 
discourse because it would compromise many 
aspects of our social interactions. Bullshitting, 
whether we like it or not, is crucial for civility and 
politeness, at least in most Western societies. 
Frankfurt calls bullshit whenever the truth is 
disregarded, but while his definition is correct, it is 
also true that people often engage in bullshitting to 
avoid confrontation, to protect someone’s feelings, 
or to socialise. In such instances, there might be 
justifiable reasons to disregard the truth. Kimbrough 
thus contends that “bullshit must be recognised for 
what it is and restricted and sanctioned to truly 
justifiable uses” (2006, sec. 5). Since the mere act of 
justifying why bullshit is preferable over truth in any 
given situation implies being able to distinguish 
between the two. 
Kimbrough, nonetheless, refuses to endorse 
Cohen’s output-centred criterion, insofar as rejecting 
the product implies rejecting the process behind it 
and hence the people responsible for it. Kimbrough 
notes that Cohen’s attempt to separate the bull from 
the shit (so to speak) cannot stand, for “it is just not 
possible to call bullshit courteously” (2006, sec. 4). 
Qualifying something as bullshit means 
marginalising it and excluding it from serious 
discussion. Many people call bullshit not because 
they feel the truth is being disregarded, but because 
the so-called bullshit threatens their beliefs or 
values. Frankfurt’s truth-centric definition remains 
valid because it circumvents such potential 
relativism by introducing Truth as a clause. 
Kimbrough’s way to reconcile Cohen’s insight that 
bullshit can be produced unintentionally while 
retaining Frankfurt’s truth-centric criteria is by 
shifting away from psychological processes (states 
of mind) and towards “methodology”. In this manner, 
the way bullshit is produced continues to be the 
determinant factor to identify it, but the utterer’s 
motivation measured against her circumstances 
become the moral compass to judge it. Put in other 
terms, bullshit is the result of adopting “lame 
methods of justification, whether intentionally, 
blamelessly, or as a result of self-deception” to 
disregard the truth. 
The following section will discuss the heterogeneity 




objections against design thinking in light of the 
definition of bullshit provided in Section 4. 
5 | DISCUSSION 
5.1 ON WHY DT IS NOT HOMOGENEOUS 
Design is a “quintessentially modern” (Parsons, 
2015, sec. 1.4) discipline that only established itself 
as a genuinely independent practice in the twentieth 
century. In the Western world, the exact origins of 
design remain contested [5], but we do know they lie 
sometime in the early Industrial Revolution—
although its philosophical roots stretch back to the 
Renaissance (Buchanan, 2001). Over the past 250 
years, Design went from being a trade activity that 
displaced “tradition-based craft” (Parsons, 2015) to a 
“segmented profession” to a “field for technical 
research” (Buchanan, 1992) and a scholarly 
discipline. Theoretical reflection on the broader 
socioeconomic and cultural role of design first 
emerged in the late nineteenth century with the Arts 
and Crafts movement. The Interwar period brought 
schools such as De Stijl and the Bauhaus, and the 
Postwar witnessed the rise and fall of the Ulm 
School of Design (Hochschule für Gestaltung Ulm), 
which played a central role in the rise of the design 
methods movement during the 1960s–70s. The last 
decades of the twentieth century brought design 
studies, and the early 2000s the prefiguration of 
“philosophy of design” – see Galle (2002) and Love 
(2000) for a short overview [6]. Discussing at length 
each one of the stages of development of Design is 
beyond the aims and possibilities of this paper. 
Nonetheless, we could partially conclude that since 
the early twentieth-century Design has come to be 
understood not only as a professional discipline but 
as a full independent epistemic system concerned 
(mainly) with the built environment. 
The exact origins of the term “design thinking” are 
difficult to trace, a quick search in Google’s Ngram 
Viewer shows its usage first began to take off in the 
1940s and grew more or less steadily throughout the 
following decades. In 1987, Peter Rowe published 
Design Thinking, a book that aimed to show how 
Architecture, Design, and urban planning are 
manifestations of the same strategy of inquiry. By 
the early 1990s, the incidence of the term shows a 
steep rise. This growth may be attributed to a series 
of academic conferences organised around this time 
– such as the “Design Thinking Research” 
symposia, as well as to various publications on DT 
by theorists such as Nigel Cross and Kees Dorst 
(see Cross, 2001). 
By the early 2000s, Todd Kelley and Tim Brown 
from the design consultancy agency IDEO branded 
their in-house “problem-solving” process as “design 
thinking” [7] and began promoting it as a new 
comprehensive strategy to foster “innovation”. By 
2006 Kelley and his colleagues secured a generous 
donation from the German software businessman 
Hasso Plattner to establish the “Stanford d.school” 
(Miller, 2018). Officially called the “Hasso Plattner 
Institute of Design”, the d.school became the de 
facto think tank of what henceforth I will be referring 
to as IDEO-DT. Through the d.school, Kelley and his 
associates have successfully popularised the 
(synecdochical) misconception that the idiom, 
practices, love of Post-it notes and, above all, the 
five-step process that emerged at IDEO are the 
essence of DT in general. In other words, they have 
failed to clarify that design methodologies and 
processes are anything but homogeneous. 
The core assumption behind the very idea of “design 
thinking” is that designing calls for a particular 
mindset: a “third way” (Brown, 2009) of regarding 
and dealing with problems, which stands in-between 
intuition and (logical) rationality [8]. The design 
theorist L. Bruce Archer argued, for example, that 
“there exists a designerly way of thinking and 
communicating” that is different from those of the 
sciences and the humanities “when applied to its 
own kinds of problems” (1979, p. 17) [9]. Archer 
contended the traditional division of scholarly 
subjects along these two axes “leaves out too 
much”, in particular, competencies concerned with 
“material culture” (1979, p. 18), and hence called for 
the institution of a “third area” in education. Design 
“with a big D” would have equal standing in 
education alongside Science and the Humanities but 
it would comprise “the collected body of practical 
knowledge based upon sensibility, invention, 
validation and implementation” (1979, p. 20). 
Furthermore, whereas the “essential language[s]” of 
Science and the Humanities are, respectively, 
(mathematical) notations and natural language, 
Design would rely on models. In short, according to 
this view, Design is a distinctive “approach to 
knowledge” and “a manner of knowing” that is 
irreducible to either corner of the conventional 
Western epistemological framework. 
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Building upon and expanding Archer’s ideas, Nigel 
Cross promoted the notion of a “designerly way of 
knowing” in a series of homonymous publications. 
There, Cross further characterised Design as a 
discipline concerned with the “man-made [sic] world” 
that values “practicality, ingenuity, empathy, and a 
concern for ‘appropriateness’” (1982, pp. 221–222); 
which normally deals with “ill-defined, ill-structured, 
or ‘wicked’” problems (1982, p. 224). Cross defends 
the epistemic autonomy of Design, urging scholars 
and practitioners to “avoid swamping our design 
research with …cultures imported either from the 
sciences or the arts” (2001, p. 55) [10]. Over the 
years he has sought to understand how and why 
designers think the way they do, and to show that 
their epistemic stance is, in fact, a manifestation of a 
fundamental aspect of human intelligence in general 
(2006). More recently, echoing the title of Rowe’s 
(1991) own book, Cross (2011) published a book 
titled Design Thinking. There, he aimed to document 
and articulate the basic cognitive and creative skills 
that designers supposedly employ, characterising 
them as a kind of “natural intelligence” [11] (Cross, 
2011, Chapter 8) that is available to anyone willing 
to develop it. 
Given the previous account, it is clear that by 
actively promoting a synecdochical identification 
between IDEO-DT and the historical understanding 
of “design thinking” the d.school and its partners 
have hijacked the meaning of this term. Most 
designers would agree that their particular 
approaches to solving design problems do not have 
to resemble the methodology and process described 
by IDEO-DT to work. Design methodologies and 
processes may exist by the hundreds, and some of 
them share a few characteristics. However, 
suggesting that one of them is the most adequate for 
every circumstance would be preposterous simply 
because it goes against the very idea of what 
designing means, i.e., creating plans. To paraphrase 
Bryan Lawson (2005, p. 48) the very idea that 
design activities occur in a given order or that they 
represent identifiable separate events is 
questionable. Both designing and the thinking 
involved in it are heterogeneous. IDEO-DT is equal 
parts design methodology (mostly inherited from 
interaction design and industrial design), and 
management theories [12] (with a high dose of 
Esalen’s “human potential” ideas). It is just one 
amongst many competing approaches to problem-
solving in design – and if we lend credit to Natasha 
Jen (2018), not a particularly effective or imaginative 
one. 
5.2 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF DESIGN 
At this point, it should be clear that Jen’s (and 
Vinsel’s) criticism is directed not at the broader 
theorisation of design as a third epistemic system, 
but specifically at IDEO-DT. Recapitulating, Jen’s 
first objection concerns the absence of an explicit 
critical component in the five stages to which IDEO-
DT reduced the design process. This particular point 
is informed by her decades as a professional 
designer who understands that creative 
improvements often come at the cost of relentless 
(and often harsh) feedback. Jen’s objection is not 
trivial; it is intimately linked to one of Design’s most 
crucial problems; one that has arguably stood 
behind every attempt to formalise and systematise 
design methods and processes: how can a designer 
be confident that what she creates will duly serve its 
purpose? That her solution will work [13]? The 
problem is epistemological; it asks what kind of 
knowledge designers require to create adequate 
solutions for any given problem? 
Design is a projective and poetic activity. It does not 
seek explanation and prediction (like the sciences) 
nor insightful understanding (like art and the 
humanities), but rather to change and (re)construct 
aspects of the world. Although definitions may vary, 
Design is more or less characterised as an activity 
concerned with “the conception and planning of the 
artificial”, to borrow Richard Buchanan’s (1992, p. 
14) words. Alternatively: 
“[…]design is the intentional solution of a 
problem, by the creation of plans for a new 
sort of thing, where the plans would not be 
immediately seen, by a reasonable person, 
as an inadequate solution.” (Parsons, 2015, 
sec. 1.1) 
To paraphrase Parsons (2015, secs 2.1–2.2), 
designers attempt to create plans for novel devices 
or processes that solve fundamentally practical 
problems. And they do so by taking into 
consideration the functional, symbolic, aesthetic, 
mediating, and even socio-political implications of 
their creations. In Design, there are no a priori 
judgements. Whether such fundamentally creative 
process can be effectively broken down into 




forever remain governed by the mysteries of intuition 
is the crux of the tension between design science 
and other approaches to design research. 
Jen’s pragmatic way of overcoming this 
epistemological dilemma is by focusing on tangible 
“evidence”, on concrete assessable outcomes, 
rather than to endlessly ponder which might be the 
best solution to a given design problem. Conversely, 
and this answers another of Jen’s objections, the 
goal of IDEO-DT is precisely to focus on the 
process. IDEO-DT is (purportedly) a method for 
coming up with “innovative” solutions, however 
outrageous they might initially seem. Because it 
promotes a (dubious) kind of epistemological 
anarchism, IDEO-DT deliberately excludes criticism 
[14]; here, “thinking-out-of-the-box” means anything 
goes, preferably if it involves a solution that has not 
been tried before. 
Interestingly, Jen’s and IDEO-DT’s understanding of 
where attention should be placed (either on the 
outcome or the process, respectively) overlap with 
the ways Cohen and Frankfurt (respectively) identify 
Bullshit. For Jen, the design process is too complex 
to be reduced to well-demarcated steps. Thus, the 
only potentially objective judgement we can make 
has to be done on the final object. Similarly, Cohen 
argues the processes that lead to bullshit are 
opaque and not necessarily intentional. Bullshit 
ought to be judged as a standalone product by its 
(lack of) clarity. 
Conversely, IDEO-DT emphasises the “how” rather 
than the “what”. The result is secondary because 
what matters is the process. Frankfurt’s moral 
criteria for identifying bullshit also fits that 
description. Whether this connection can tell us 
something about ethics or epistemology, could 
perhaps be addressed elsewhere. 
5.3 INNOVATION AND DESIGN AS A LIBERAL ART 
The last of Jen’s objections against IDEO-DT 
concern the way its advocates reify “innovation” and 
promote a “fast-food” logic of (design) education. 
Her views overlap with Vinsel’s criticism. Drawing on 
his scholarly knowledge of the history, dynamics, 
and socio-economic impact of technological change, 
Vinsel contends that “there is no evidence that 
IDEO, design thinking, or the d.school have 
contributed to deep [sociotechnical] change”. He is 
particularly critical of the “superficial” way in which 
organisations such as IDEO employ the very term 
“innovation”. Indeed, a simple exploratory reading of 
IDEO-DT literature shows that innovation is used 
extensively as a noun, verb, adjective, and more. 
However, finding anything even remotely similar to a 
definition of this term proves remarkably difficult. 
Consequently, it is perhaps best to assume that, 
“innovation” is used by IDEO-DT advocates as a 
slightly fancier substitute for (technological) 
“change”. 
As a concept, innovation has a long and not so 
illustrious history, since before the nineteenth 
century it had a mostly pejorative meaning. The 
contemporary English word “innovation” comes from 
late thirteenth century French, which itself comes 
from the Latin term innovo (renewal or make 
change). Innovo descends from the Greek term 
kainotomia, which derives from kainos (new), and 
meant “cutting fresh into” or “making new”. 
Eventually, it was the metaphorical use of 
kainotomia that gave innovation its contemporary 
sense (see Godin, 2014, 2015). In the late 
eighteenth century innovation began to be conflated 
with “imagination” and (creative) combination—
mainly by Romanticism – but it remained, for the 
most part, an obscure term. In the twentieth century, 
Joseph Schumpeter rehabilitated and endowed 
innovation with its contemporary economic meaning 
of commercialised invention (Godin, 2014, p. 15). 
The contemporary view of innovation (the idea that it 
is the panacea for every problem) is symptomatic of 
the ways we have come to understand human 
progress and well-being. It is a manifestation of the 
shift in sensibilities concerning which human 
activities and practices are most beneficial for 
society at large and, therefore, should be 
encouraged and promoted by public and private 
organisations. The idea of innovation came to 
substitute the pure vs. applied science dichotomy 
that had dominated government development 
policies before WWII. After the 1957 Sputnik crisis, 
the American government began to funnel a 
considerable amount of resources (funding, for 
example, what would become DARPA) not only to 
enhance basic science but also to conduct research 
in creativity. Technology came to be seen not only 
as the application of theoretical science but as the 
product of creativity and entrepreneurial spirit. By 
the 1960s the policy-making doctrine in the West 
had recognised that scientific research by itself 
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could not provide direct and tangible (a.k.a. 
profitable) answers to pressing problems, something 
else was required. Innovation thus came to be 
equated to technological invention or change, 
preferably one that could be immediately 
commercialised. 
Vinsel’s objection against IDEO-DT’s somewhat 
liberal use of the term “innovation” tacitly appeals to 
the chasm that exists between a truly innovative 
technological system, say railroads or the Internet, 
vs. something like the now-defunct “Juicero” or the 
“Fyre Festival” fiasco [15]. Whereas the first 
examples have led to lasting and profound socio-
economic, political, cultural, and environmental 
changes, the latter turned at best into cautionary 
tales about the perils of twenty-first-century start-up 
culture. 
Vinsel’s second objection concerns the proposition 
that IDEO-DT could become the core of (a new 
strain of) liberal arts. This idea relates to the notion 
that design is an independent epistemic system 
midway between the sciences and the humanities. 
Vinsel’s criticism is mainly informed by Miller’s 
(2018) article, “Is ‘Design Thinking’ the New Liberal 
Arts?” wherein the latter ponders the potential 
benefits of applying the d.schools “anti-
establishment” (i.e. unstructured) approach to 
design methods in education at large. Although 
seemingly seduced by the d.school’s ideas, Miller is 
nonetheless careful to critique the way IDEO 
literature eschews virtually all “serious consideration 
on ‘pastness’” in favour of present-tense problem-
solving. However, neither Miller nor Vinsel seem to 
be aware that the characterisation of design as a 
liberal art precedes the foundation of the d.school for 
several years. And furthermore, that an influential 
strain of management theory portrays management 
as both a liberal art (Peter Drucker) and as design 
(Peter Senge) (see Dunne & Martin, 2006; and 
LoRusso, 2017). 
In an article titled Wicked Problems in Design 
Thinking, Buchanan (1992, p. 5) contends design 
“should be recognized as a new liberal art of 
technological culture”. For him, a liberal art provides 
above all an “integrated understanding of human 
experience” and, seen under such terms, the 
hypothetic role of design would be to “integrate 
useful knowledge from the arts and the sciences 
alike” (1992, p. 6). Buchanan draws heavily on John 
Dewey’s (pragmatist) understanding of “technology” 
as an “art of experimental thinking” (1992, p. 8). By 
“liberal art” Buchanan explicitly means a “discipline 
of thinking” that may be shared by everyone, and 
that could be mastered by a few individuals “with 
distinctive insight”. In other words, Buchanan is 
reframing the kind of literacy, or rather “design 
awareness”, that Archer (1979, p. 20) had 
envisioned a decade before. Both Archer and 
Buchanan regard Design as an “architectonic” field 
capable of providing a type of insight that is not 
accessible to traditional humanistic or scientific 
disciplines: something akin to a “maker’s 
knowledge”, wherein practical and theoretical know-
how complement each other to reach “full and useful 
episteme” (see Floridi, 2011, p. 288). 
Archer’s and Buchanan’s idealised future for design 
education is far removed from the reality of IDEO-DT 
training, with its emphasis on instant and painless 
results. While hardly anyone would object to people 
of all ages having a minimum of design literacy, 
Vinsel’s and Jen’s critique encourages us to look 
beyond IDEO-DT for inspiration to build what could 
become a new maker’s discipline. One that 
genuinely reflects the complexities and depth of the 
new old learning that proper design offers. 
6 | CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Admittedly, Jen’s and Vinsel’s criticism of IDEO-DT 
is blunt and incomprehensive, for neither care to 
describe DT methodology in depth. Nonetheless, 
beyond the name-calling, both have managed to 
touch on key aspects that reveal why IDEO-DT 
should perhaps come under more thorough scrutiny. 
Jen did not explain what she understands by 
“bullshit”, however most likely she was using the 
term in its most common everyday meaning of 
“nonsense”. 
A simple skimming of IDEO-DT publications shows 
that it is filled with jargon which is rarely clarified by 
its authors. Such type of obfuscation partially meets 
Cohen’s criteria of “unclarifiable unclarity”; but it 
would be an exaggeration to say that everything 
about IDEO-DT is nonsense. By implicitly promoting 
the notion that IDEO-DT is all there is to “design 
thinking”, and hence disregarding the truth, the 
d.school might be engaging in the more morally 
questionable Frankfurt bullshit. However, whether 
the promoters of IDEO-DT have failed to 




methods out of ignorance, self-deception, or lack of 
interest is impossible to know. Having such lame 
reasons for engaging in bullshit meets Kimbrough’s 
criteria, but it would be impossible to generalise the 
judgement. And yet, at least some of the ideas 
advanced by IDEO-DT do have their roots in design 
research. These reasons, along with the fact that 
bullshit itself remains a contested notion, mean that 
one must suspend judgement on whether everything 
about IDEO-DT can be dismissed as bullshit. 
The above conclusion illustrates why name-calling 
rarely (if ever) leads to fruitful scholarly exchanges, 
more so when the whole point of the expletive is to 
marginalise the subject and exclude it from serious 
discussion. The goal of this paper has been to show 
precisely why critical analysis of IDEO-DT needs to 
go beyond derision. This is not to say that 
denouncing bullshit is not a moral imperative, 
particularly in the age of exponential growth of 
information warfare. But perhaps, rather than just 
mocking the tasteless echo chamber of the five-step 
design process and the way advocates of IDEO-DT 
idolise Post-it notes, we should focus on making true 
design literacy more available. That is, promoting an 
understanding of the history, complexity, and 
potential of design outside the d.school’s box. 
Throughout this paper, we have seen that both 
design thinking and bullshit are far from being 
homogeneous concepts. Hence, to determine 
whether Jen’s and Vinsel’s criticism held it was first 
necessary to determine which kind of DT they were 
referring to and what could be understood by bullshit 
in the first place. Their critique has served as an 
opportunity to show how IDEO-DT has hijacked the 
meaning of design thinking and, as a result, many 
complex ideas underpinning design methodology 
have been washed off, forgotten, or supplanted by 
business jargon. In the eyes of those who stumble 
upon IDEO-DT and d.school literature, and who 
possess little or no knowledge of the rich history of 
design research, this methodology (depending on 
their leanings) appears as a seductive tool or as yet 
another management fad. Unbeknownst to them, is 
the fact that “traditional” DT represents, to borrow 
Buchanan’s words, a sincere attempt to recognise 
and elevate the dignity and importance, not only of 
design but of maker’s knowledge in general. Such a 
state of affairs calls for a deeper and broader 
critique of IDEO-DT and the concepts it promotes 
(such as innovation and creativity). Not only 
because it trivialises an entire human discipline, but 
also to reclaim the actual contributions that design, 
as an epistemic system, can bring to other domains 
of human activity. Part of this strategy could perhaps 
involve steering away from the idea that there is a 
designerly way of thinking and focus instead on 
proving why designers, like other “doers”, create 
practical knowledge. 
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ENDNOTES 
[1] Despite receiving considerable criticism, Jen has 
persisted on her criticism (see Jen, 2018). 
[2] The human potential movement. 
[3] Vinsel cites a recent article in which history 
professor, Peter N. Miller (2018), discusses 
precisely that possibility. 
[4] As well as a commercial and popular success. As 
Hardcastle & Reisch (2006) note, despite being a 
typical, unassuming academic work, the book rose 
to the New York Times’ bestseller list, where it 
remained for twenty-six weeks. 
[5] The disagreements concerning the origins of 
design have much to do with the way design itself is 
conceived by different authors. A vital tension is how 
to distinguish the craftsperson from the designer 
(Parsons, 2015, sec. 1.4). 
[6] Whereas design theory is mainly concerned with 
the practice of Design, philosophy of design is 
concerned with Design and its specific aims and 
problems “in light of the fundamental questions that 
philosophy examines: questions about knowledge, 
ethics, aesthetics and the nature of reality” (Parsons, 
2015, Introduction). 
[7] Reading Tim Brown’s book, Change by Design 
(2009, Introduction), one gets the impression that 
the very concept of design thinking emerged in the 
early 2000s during a casual conversation between 
him and Kelley. 
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[8] This epistemic middle-ground echoes C.P. 
Snow’s account of the “Two Cultures” (1959/2012), 
as well as his latter, more conciliatory 
characterisation of the “third culture” (1963/2012). 
[9] Archer (1979, p. 17) characterises design 
problems as “ill-defined”, more or less following 
Horst Rittel’s (1973) concept of “wicked problems”, 
i.e. the kind in which there is no consensus about 
the definition of the problem itself nor its solution. 
For thorough discussions of wicked problems see 
Churchman (1967) and Coyne (2005). 
[10] Cross’s statement resembles Clement 
Greenberg’s (1940/1999) quintessentially modernist 
defence of the “purity” of the artistic medium. 
[11] It is important to note that Cross partially builds 
this argument on Howard Gardner’s (1983/2011) 
“theory of multiple intelligences”. 
[12] Arguably, IDEO-DT’s emphasis on empathy can 
be traced back to the ideas of management theorists 
such as Douglas McGregor, Abraham Maslow, or 
Robert Greenleaf (for an overview see LoRusso, 
2017). 
[13] For a lengthy discussion on this problem see 
Galle (2011) and Parsons (2015, sec. 2.3). 
[14] The rationale for doing so is best summarised in 
the following quote: “design thinking involves a 
commitment of participants and facilitators to 
discouraging criticism in product development 
interaction […] Deferring adverse judgments has 
been argued to fundamentally help improve 
creativity in idea generation processes” (Reimann & 
Schilke, 2011, p. 53). 
[15] The Juicero was a USD 700 Wi-Fi enabled 
juicer that worked exclusively with pre-packaged 
bags of fruits and vegetables. Highly criticised since 
it was first released into the market, the Juicero was 
revealed as an unnecessarily complex device after a 
youtuber showed how he could squeeze the juice 
out of the bags with his bare hands. The “Fyre 
Festival” was a luxury music festival for which 
attendees had to pay thousands of dollars but was 
eventually cancelled after multiple irregularities. The 
organisers faced multimillion lawsuits and at least 
one of them was sentenced to prison. 
REFERENCES 
Archer, B. (1979). Design as a discipline. Design 
Studies, 1(1), 17–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/0142-
694x(79)90023-1 
Black, M. (1982). The prevalence of humbug. 




Brown, T. (2008). Design thinking. Harvard Business 
Review, 85–92. Retrieved from 
https://hbr.org/2008/06/design-thinking 
Brown, T. (2009). Change by design: How design 
thinking transforms organizations and inspires 
innovation. New York; London: Harper Collins e-
books. 
Buchanan, R. (1992). Wicked problems in design 
thinking. Design Issues, 8(2), 5. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1511637 
Buchanan, R. (2001). Design research and the new 
learning. Design Issues, 17(4), 3–23. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/07479360152681056 
Churchman, C. W. (1967). Guest editorial: Wicked 
problems. Management Science, 14(4), B141–B142. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.14.4.B141 
Cohen, G. A. (2002). Deeper into bullshit. In S. Buss 
& L. Overton (Eds.), Contours of agency: Essays on 
themes from Harry Frankfurt (pp. 321–339). 
Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: The MIT 
Press. 
Coyne, R. (2005). Wicked problems revisited. 
Design Studies, 26(1), 5–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.destud.2004.06.005 
Cross, N. (1982). Designerly ways of knowing. 
Design Studies, 3(4), 221–227. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0142-694x(82)90040-0 
Cross, N. (2001). Designerly ways of knowing: 
Design discipline versus design science. Design 
Issues, 17(3), 49–55. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/074793601750357196 






Cross, N. (2011). Design thinking: Understanding 
how designers think and work. Oxford; New York: 
Berg. 
Dunne, D., & Martin, R. (2006). Design thinking and 
how it will change management education: An 
interview and discussion. Academy of Management 
Learning & Education, 5(4), 512–523. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/amle.2006.23473212 
Floridi, L. (2011). A defence of constructionism: 
Philosophy as conceptual engineering. 
Metaphilosophy, 42(3), 282–304. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2011.01693.x 
Frankfurt, H. (2005). On bullshit. New Jersey; 
Oxford: Princeton University Press. (Original work 
published 1986) 
Galle, P. (2002). Philosophy of design: An editorial 
introduction. Design Studies, 23(3), 211–218. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0142-694x(01)00034-5 
Galle, P. (2011). Foundational and instrumental 
design theory. Design Issues, 27(4), 81–94. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/desi_a_00107 
Gardner, H. (2011). Frames of mind: The theory of 
multiple intelligences (3rd ed.). New York: Basic 
Books. (Original work published 1983) 
Godin, B. (2008). Innovation: The history of a 
category (Working paper No. 1). Montréal: Project 
on the Intellectual History of Innovation. Retrieved 
from http://www.csiic.ca/PDF/IntellectualNo1.pdf 
Godin, B. (2014). Innovation and creativity: A 
slogan, nothing but a slogan (Working paper No. 
18). Montréal: Project on the Intellectual History of 
Innovation. Retrieved from 
http://www.csiic.ca/PDF/CreativityEnglish.pdf 
Godin, B. (2015). Innovation contested: The idea of 
innovation over the centuries. New York; London: 
Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315855608 
Graeber, D. (2015). The utopia of rules: On 
technology, stupidity, and the secret joys of 
bureaucracy. Brooklyn; London: Melville House. 
Greenberg, C. (1999). Towards a newer Laocoön. In 
C. Harrison & P. Wood (Eds.), Art in theory 1900–
1990: An anthology of changing ideas (12th reprint, 
pp. 554–560). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing. 
(Original work published 1940) 
Hardcastle, G. L., & Reisch, G. A. (2006). On 
bullshitmania. In G. L. Hardcastle & G. A. Reisch 
(Eds.), Bullshit and philosophy. Chicago: Open 
Court. 
Jen, N. (2017). Design thinking is bullshit [Talk]. 
Retrieved 2 September 2018, from 
http://99u.com/videos/55967/natasha-jen-design-
thinking-is-bullshit 
Jen, N. (2018, August 21). Graphic designer 
Natasha Jen poses six questions for design thinkers 




Kimbrough, S. (2006). On letting it slide. In G. L. 
Hardcastle & G. A. Reisch (Eds.), Bullshit and 
philosophy. Chicago: Open Court. 
Lawson, B. (2005). How designers think: The design 
process demystified (4th ed.). Oxford; Burlington: 
Architectural Press. 
LoRusso, J. D. (2017). Spirituality, corporate culture, 
and american busines: The neoliberal ethic and the 
spirit of global capital. London; New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic. 
Love, T. (2000). Philosophy of design: A meta-
theoretical structure for design theory. Design 
Studies, 21(3), 293–313. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0142-694x(99)00012-5 
Miller, P. N. (2018, March 26). Is ‘design thinking’ 
the new liberal arts? Retrieved 2 September 2018, 
from https://www.chronicle.com/article/Is-Design-
Thinking-the-New/228779?cid=at 
Parsons, G. (2015). The philosophy of design. 
Cambridge; Malden: Polity Press. 
Peck, J. (2010). Constructions of neoliberal reason. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Reimann, M., & Schilke, O. (2011). Product 
differentiation by aesthetic and creative design: A 
psychological and neural framework of design 
thinking. In H. Plattner, C. Meinel, & L. Leifer (Eds.), 
Design thinking: Understand – improve – apply (pp. 
45–57). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13757-0_3 
 Journal of Science and Technology of the Arts, Volume 10, No. 3 – Special Issue xCoAx 2018 – 2018 
 CITARJ 
 2-57 
Rittel, H. W. J., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas 
in a general theory of planning. Policy Sciences, 
4(2), 155–169. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01405730 
Rowe, P. G. (1991). Design thinking. Cambridge; 
London: The MIT Press. (Original work published 
1986) 
Snow, C. (2012). The rede lecture. In The two 
cultures (15th Reprint, pp. 1–51). UK: Cambridge 
University Press. (Original work published 1959) 
Snow, C. (2012). The two cultures: A second look. In 
The two cultures (15th Reprint, pp. 53–100). UK: 
Cambridge University Press. (Original work 
published 1963) 
Spicer, A. (2017, November 23). From inboxing to 
thought showers: How business bullshit took over. 




Vinsel, L. (2017, December 6). Design Thinking is 
Kind of Like Syphilis—It’s Contagious and Rots Your 





Rodrigo Hernández-Ramírez studied 
communication, design & visual communication, and 
philosophy of science in his native Mexico City. 
Having worked as a designer and front-end 
developer, he holds an MA in multimedia art with a 
specialisation in photography from the University of 
Lisbon, where he also obtained a PhD in fine arts 
with specialisation in multimedia art. He is a 
collaborator at the Centre for Research and Studies 
in Fine Arts (CIEBA) at the same institution. 
Currently, he teaches design methodology at the 
Instituto de Arte, Design e Empresa (IADE), in 
Lisbon. His research interests stand at the 
intersection of philosophy of technology, design, and 
new media art. He is particularly interested in 
human–technology relations and how technologies 
shape the way we understand the world and 
ourselves. 
 
